We present a structural attack on the DME cryptosystem with paramenters (3, 2, q). The attack recovers 10 of the 12 coefficients of the first linear map. We also show that, if those 12 coefficients were known, the rest of the private key can be efficiently obtained by solving systems of quadratic equations with just two variables.
Introduction
DME stands for "double matrix exponentiation". It is a family of multivariate encryption primitives over finite fields, parametrized by two integers and a field size (in bits). It was developed by Luengo, and the version with parameters (3, 2, 2 48 ) was presented to the NIST call for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms [1] .
The encryption map consists on a composition of three secret linear maps and two public matrix exponentiations, defining a polynomial map with very high degree, and moderated number of monomials. This map which can be inverted provided we know the secret linear maps.
During the revision process at NIST, Weullens claimed to have found an attack against DME-(3, 2, 2 48 ) consisting on using Weil descent to convert the map in a quartic one over F 2 (with a much larger set of variables), and then decompose it in two quadratic ones. However, his claims about the complexity and/or feasibility of such an attack could not be proved (see [2] ).
Later, Weullens proposed another attack ([3] , [4] ) against the submitted implementation that took advantage of the lack of a proper padding. This attack used 2 24 decryption queries, and analyzed the cases where the decryption resulted in an error. It was practical, but did not essentially break the underlying mathematical problem, so it could be prevented by using a secure padding.
Here we present a structural attack against DME-(3, 2, q) that reduces the difficulty of recovering the private key from the public one from the claimed 256 bits to just log 2 (q 2 ). It is completely passive in the sense that it does not require any interaction, just the knowledge of the public key. The attack does not rely on any implementation details, since it considers only the underlying mathematical problem.
Description of the system
We first describe the DME cryptosystem. We focus only on the mathematical description, ignoring all the implementation details (such as how bits are transformed into elements of F q , padding, etc).
Setup
The system requires a common setup for all users, consisting on the following:
• Two positive integers m ≥ n.
• A finite field F q of characteristic p.
• An explicit isomorphism of F q -vector spaces F n q ∼ = F q n .
• An explicit isomorphism of F q -vector spaces F m q ∼ = F q m .
• A m×m matrix E, whose nonzero entries are powers of p, that is invertible modulo q n − 1, and whose rows have only two nonzero. entries.
• A n × n matrix F , whose nonzero entries are powers of p, that is invertible modulo q m − 1, and whose rows have only two nonzero entries.
For the implementation submitted to the NIST call the following choices were made:
• m = 3, n = 2.
• The field F q is the field of 2 48 elements, represented as polynomials in F 2 [x] modulo the polynomial x 48 + x 28 + x 27 + x + 1.
• • M is the identity.
Matrix exponentiations
The scheme makes use of a special kind of maps called matrix exponentiations. Consider a vectorx = (x 1 . . . , x m ) ∈ (F * q n ) m , and the matrix E defined above. We define the vectorx E :
Analogously, we define a map (F * q m ) n → (F * q m ) n by using the matrix F . It is easy to check that these are polynomial maps, even considered as maps from F nm q to F nm q (by composing with the isomorphisms fixed in the setup). It is also easy to check that the inverse matrices (mod q n − 1 and q m − 1 respectively) determine inverse maps.
By abuse of notation, we use the same letter to represent both the matrix and the corresponding map.
Keys and encryption/decryption maps
With this setup, the private key is a triple of invertible nm × nm matrices over F q , (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ) such that L 1 is a diagonal sum of m square blocks L 11 , . . . , L 1m of size n×n; L 2 and L 3 are diagonal sums of n blocks (L 21 , . . . , L 2n and L 31 , . . . , L 3n respectively) of size m × m. They can be regarded as linear maps F nm q → F nm q . Once chosen these matrices, we can consider the following composition of maps
The result is a multivariate polynomial map from F nm q to itself. In the expanded expression of this map, the exponents that appear at the end depend only on the entries of E and F , hence are public. The public key will be the coefficients that appear in that expression. The structure of the system has been carefully designed to ensure that the number of monomials in this expansion is not too large.
Note that each step in the composition is invertible (assuming we stay always inside (F * q n ) m and (F * q m ) n at the steps E and F respectively) by using the inverses of the involved matrices. That is, the whole map can be efficiently inverted if we know the private key.
Malleability of the private key
In this section we show how different private keys may correspond to the same public key. This fact will be used to assume that the private key has a special form.
From now on, we assume that n = 2 and m = 3, as in the version submitted to the NIST.
Take α ∈ F * q 2 . The multiplication by α defines a map from F q 2 to itself that is F q -linear. So there exists a matrix H(α) such that the corresponding linear map makes the following diagram commute.
Analogously, for any λ ∈ F * q 3 there exist a matrix G(λ) whose corresponding linear map makes the following diagram commute
Then the private keys
correspond to the same public key.
Proof. Is a direct consequence of the commutativity of the previous diagrams, and the fact that
Analogously, we also have Lemma 2. Let λ, µ ∈ F * q 3 . Then the private keys
produce the same public key.
We can use these facts to assume that the private key has a specific form Lemma 3. Every valid public key corresponds to a private key that satisfies the following form:
where the * symbols represent arbitrary elements of F q .
Proof. If it comes from a secret key (L 11 , L 12 , L 13 , L 21 , L 22 , L 31 , L 32 ), we choose α, β ∈ F * q 2 as follows:
• α is the multiplicative inverse of the element of F q 2 corresponding (via the isomorphism) to the second column of L 11 .
• β is the multiplicative inverse of the element of F q 2 corresponding to the second column of L 12 .
This way, H(α)L 11 = * 1 * 0 and H(β)L 12 = * 1 * 0 .
Let τ be the element of F q 2 corresponding to the second column of L 13 . Assume that α −E21 τ E23 = δ + εT with δ = 0. Choose γ ∈ F * q 2 such that α E21 γ E23 = δ −1 (this can be done easily by raising δ −1 α −E21 to the inverse of
If δ = 0 we can do a similar computation using ε instead of δ, to get that (a + bT ) E23 = T .
Applying Lemma 1 with α, β, γ ∈ F * q 2 , we can construct a private key with L 11 , L 12 , L 13 as in the statement. Now choose λ, µ to be the inverse multiplicatives of the elements of F q 3 corresponding to the third column of L 21 and the first column of L 22 respectively.
Applying Lemma 2 to this new private key we obtain one where L 21 , L 22 are also as claimed.
Recovering information about the special private key from the public key
In this section we assume that the private key has the form obtained in the previous section. We show how to compute the unknown coefficients of L 1 from the coefficients in the public key. Moreover, we can also compute six coefficients from L 3 . Let's start by fixing some notation. Let l 11 , l 12 be the elements of F q 2 that correspond to the columns of L 11 . As we have shown in the previous section, we can assume that l 12 = 1. Analogously, l 21 , l 22 and l 31 , l 32 are the elements of F q 2 that correspond to the columns of L 12 and L 13 , respectively. As before, we can assume that l 22 = 1 and l 32 = a + bT where (a + bT ) E23 is either 1 + cT or T . Define
Lemma 4. Let (η 1 , η 2 , η 3 ), (η 4 , η 5 , η 6 ) be the first column of L 31 and L 32 respectively.
If we write the encryption map as a polynomial in x 1 , . . . , x 6 , and (a + bT ) E23 = 1 + cT , the terms that only involve the variables x 1 and x 6 in the i'th component are
If (a + bT ) E23 = T there are no terms that only involve these variables.
Similarly, the terms that only involve the variables x 1 , x 5 are
Analogous formulas hold for the terms involving x 2 , x 6 and x 2 , x 5 , using g 1 , g 2 and h 1 , h 2 instead of f 1 , f 2 respectively.
Proof. We proof the case for x 1 , x 5 , and the rest are done similarly.
Let's start with the vector (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 , x 6 ) and apply the steps of the encription map. After the first linear map L 1 , we get a vector formed by stacking the three vectors L 11
x 1 x 2 , L 12
x 3 x 4 and L 13
x 5 x 6 . The elements of F q 2 that correspond to these vectors are x 1 l 11 + x 2 l 12 , x 3 l 21 + x 4 l 22 and x 5 l 31 + x 6 l 32 respectively. After applying the exponential maps that corresponds to E,we have the vectors corresponding to
• (x 1 l 11 + x 2 l 12 ) E11 (x 3 l 21 + x 4 l 22 ) E12
• (x 1 l 11 + x 2 l 12 ) E21 (x 5 l 31 + x 6 l 32 ) E23
• (x 3 l 21 + x 4 l 22 ) E32 (x 5 l 31 + x 6 l 32 ) E33
In the expansion of those expressions, there all terms involve variables that are not x 1 or x 5 except the in the second one, where there is the term x E21 1 x E23 5 l 11 E21 l 31 E23 . That is, the vector in F 6 q that we get at this stage is
where the • • • symbols represent sums of terms that don't involve only the variables x 1 and x 5 . After applying L 2 , we get
Expressed as a vector in F 2 q 3 , this is
where again,the • • • symbols represent a sum of terms that don't involve only x 1 and x 5 , but this time with coefficients in F q 3 , but notice that the coefficients that only involve x 1 and x 5 are actually elements of F q . Now, applying the exponentiation corresponding to F , we get the vector in F 2
, which corresponds to the vector in F 6
Recovering the coefficients of L 1
Now we see how to recover the coefficients of L 1 from the public key.
Assume c = 0 (otherwise, we can detect the case because there are no terms involving only x 1 , x 6 in the public key; we can apply a linear change of variables to fall into this case).
From the previous section, we know the following column vectors
Taking quotients between them we an eliminate the η i , and hence we can
know the values of f F11 . Since the exponentiation map is invertible, these two values allow us to recover f 1 and f2 c . Analogously, we can also recover g 1 , g2 c , h 1 and h2 c . Let's denote f ′ 2 := f2 c , g ′ 2 := g2 c and h ′ 2 := h2 c . Now we have the equations
In this expression the only unknown is c. This is an equation in F q 2 that translates into two cuadratic equations in F q on c, that must have at least one common nonzero solution. Note that one of them has no constant term, so one of its solution is zero. That is, we can determine c completely.
With the value of c, we also get f 2 , g 2 and h 2 . So we have l 31 E23 = h 1 + h 2 T . Raising to the inverse of E 23 modulo q 2 −1, we recover l 31 . We can also compute l 11 E21 = f1+f2T h1+h2T and hence l 11 . Moreover, from 1 + cT we can recover a, b such that (a+bT ) E23 = 1+cT , and hence, we have completely recovered the matrices L 11 and L 13 .
Since we have c and c F12 η i , we can also compute η i . Sumarizing, we have proved the following:
Theorem 1. Given a valid public key, there exists a corresponding private key of the form: Notice that, if we could find the two missing coefficients of L 12 , we would be able to precompose the map with the inverse of L 1 , and then with the inverse of E, leaving us with a map consisting only on a known matrix exponentiation map composed on both sides with two (partially) unknown linear maps.
Recovering L 2 and L 3
With the previous steps, we would only need to find two missing coefficients of L 12 to reduce the problem to attacking a weaker variant of the scheme, with the following structure in the case 3, 2:
In this section, we see how to recover the entries of L 3 (and then, trivially we get L 2 assuming only that we know the total composition map, and the entries of F . Now, denote by ζ 1 , ζ 2 , ζ 3 the columns of L 21 , interpreted as elements of F q 3 , and by ζ 4 , ζ 5 , ζ 6 the columns of L 22 . Analogously, the columns of L −1 31 and L −1 32 will be denoted as ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 , ϑ 3 and ϑ 4 , ϑ 5 , ϑ 6 respectively. Note that, by the same kind of arguments used in Section 3, we can assume that ϑ 3 = ϑ 6 = 1. If we apply L 2 to the vector (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) we get a column vector of the form ζ 1 ζ4
where ζ 1 and ζ 4 are considered now as a vector with three coordinates. Its image by F is
And the final aplication of L 3 gives a vector (z 14 1 , . . . , z 14 6 ), that is known (since it is just the result of the full map to the starting vector). Applying the inverse of L 3 , we get that Analogously, we can solve for ϑ 4 , ϑ 5 . Then, solving for ζ 1 , . . . ζ 6 can be done just by applying the inverse of F .
Once we get all the values ϑ i and ζ j , we have effectively recovered the private key.
Conclusion
We have presented a structural attack to the DME cryptosystem with parameters (3, 2, q), that is able to recover the full private key from the public key and two extra elements of F q that deppend on the private key. An exhaustive search gives an upper bound of q 2 to the security level. In particular, for the DME (3, 2, 2 48 ) version submitted to the NIST, this bound gives at most 96 bits of security, far less than the required 256 bits.
The attack only uses a very small fraction of the information contained in the public key. So we suspect that a deeper analysis could provide a better method than the exhaustive search for the full recovery of the private key.
Further research would be needed to determine if other choices of parameters are vulnerable to similar attacks.
